The state of Ukraine's counter-offensive

To say Ukraine’s counter-offensive has not progressed as quickly as it had hoped is to state an objective fact.

To say, however, that it has not progressed as quickly as it should have, or that it would have been more successful if only Ukraine had employed “proper” Western tactics, is to reveal to the world one’s utter ignorance of military matters.

That view was one taken by the German military who in a leaked assessment of the counter-offensive earlier this month, lashed out at Kyiv’s alleged failure to adopt the lessons its troops have been learning in Western boot camps.

The fact is, as General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staffs said last month, the task facing Kyiv’s forces in the south is about the hardest a military can undertake: an opposed advance across pre-prepared minefields towards professionally constructed defensive positions, all without command of the air, and all while Russia re-seeds minefields with artillery-launched munitions.

Add to that the fact that Ukraine is leaning heavily on new recruits with limited combat experience while trying to integrate onto new, Western equipment and transform their operating concepts away from Soviet models, and the Herculean nature of their task becomes clear.

The fact the Ukrainian forces largely operating without Western-supplied kit like Leopard 2 tanks are having greater success around the blasted shell of Bakhmut, in the Donbas, than their counterparts in the south with the new kit, shows how much effort Russia is putting into stopping Kyiv’s push towards the Sea of Azov.

Certainly, the survival rate of crews hit in Western tanks far exceeds those in Russian vehicles, but an anti-tank round can blow the tracks off a Leopard 2 just as easily as a T-64. That will slow any advance and embolden Russian defenders.

In some areas of the southern front Russia has seeded the ground with as many as five mines per square metre and British defence intelligence says the summer’s new growth of low-lying scrub has obscured the ground, making those mines harder to spot.

All of which means the counter-offensive, running since early June, has been extremely tough. To an extent, it has forced Ukraine to change tactics; to move from a mobile assault led by vehicles to one that is much more infantry-centric, a style arguably more suited to Kyiv’s strengths even if it is a step back from the “Western way of combined arms warfare”.

This may be a more attritional style of fighting, but if, as seems likely, Ukraine is better than Russia at coordinating platoon and company-level efforts - integrating infantry and artillery so as to move forward without unnecessarily risking lives - a step back now in conceptual terms may enable greater strides forward in the future.

Of course, details from the front are scarce and Russian forces have been shown to be brittle; a crack could lead to the kind of advance witnessed last year east of Kharkiv.

Any more significant injection of military capability though, in a bid to change any stalemate and present a hitherto unseen problem for the Kremlin, will take months to develop. There is no guarantee, of course, that the addition of airpower through F-16s or helicopter-borne air assault or amphibious raiding capabilities would be successful anyway. The disastrous amphibious raid on Dieppe and the infamous assault on the “bridge too far” at Arnhem, both from the Second World War, show how perilous such operations can be.

Ukraine could attempt to break Russian lines further north, where the minefields are shallower and Moscow’s defensive positions less well prepared given the fluidity of the fighting. They might then be able to swing east and south, to race towards the coast from behind Russian lines. However, any such move would leave a horribly exposed flank and a long - and vulnerable - logistic tail.

There are no easy answers in war. Ukrainian planning staff will keep in mind the old military maxim: never forget the enemy gets a vote.

Without a sudden collapse of Russian lines, any great leap forward is unlikely to come quickly. In a few short weeks the “rasputitsa” will show itself again and the earth will turn to cloying mud, gumming up movement and rendering all but the best-prepared routes impassable. There is a very real possibility we may see no significant shift this year in the front lines from where they are today.

What would be the impact globally, were the lines to be frozen for another year?

There would be domestic pressure from politically ambitious sectors of society in those external supporters of Ukraine facing elections. Those in power may feel the need to be seen as stronger in their dealings with President Volodymyr Zelensky (we have already witnessed bursts of stray voltage over how “grateful” Ukraine should be for weapons and diplomatic support). Those of a more Russophile persuasion may demand action on the battlefield, or threaten to withhold weapon transfers. It will take concerted diplomatic effort - led by the US, with Nato close behind  - to withstand such brickbats.

And then there is the big orange elephant in the room.

The starting gun for the 2024 US presidential election may already have been fired, with the launch of proceedings against Donald Trump on charges of allegedly attempting to subvert the 2020 vote. Regardless, it will not be long before the issue of support for Ukraine becomes an even more fevered topic in US politics than it already is.

Time is still on Ukraine’s side, for now, but the stymied offensive has forced a change in tactics on the battlefield.

If the conflict freezes roughly along the lines as they are today, there will not be many more months before Mr Zelensky may have to change tactics politically too.